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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

WENDELL WILFORD WELLING,

:

Plaintiff-Appellant,

:

Case No. 930659-CA

vs.
Priority 15
CHRISTY MORRIS WELLING,

:

Defendant-Appellee.

:

Oral Argument Requested

JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court by Utah Code Ann. §782a-3(2)(h) (Supp. 1992).
ISSUES PRESENTED
1.

Whether the trial court erred in determining Mr. Welling's

income for purposes of child support. The determination of whether
the trial court exercised its discretion based on mistaken view of
the law is reviewed de novo by this court.
113 0, 1134 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
reviewed for abuse of discretion.

Gaw v. State, 798 P.2d

The underlying support award is
Woodward v. Woodward, 70 9 P.2d

393, 394 (Utah 1985).
2.

Whether

the

trial

court

abused

its

discretion

in

determining that Ms. Welling had need of attorneys' fees and in
granting an award of those fees?
of discretion.
1991).

The award is reviewed for abuse

Crouse v. Crouse, 817 P. 2d 836

(Utah Ct. App.

DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
The following statutory provisions are determinative of
this Appeal.
Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7.5(2) "Income from earned income
sources is limited to the equivalent of one full-time job."
Utah Code Ann. §78-45-3 "Every father shall support his
child; and every man shall support his wife when she is in need."
Utah Code Ann. §30-3-3 (1) "In any action filed under Title
30, Chapter 3, 4, or 6, and in any action to establish an order of
custody, visitation, child support, alimony or division of property
in a domestic case, the Court may order a party to pay the costs,
attorneys fees, and witness fees, including expert witness fees, of
the other party to enable the other party to prosecute or defend
the action.

The order may include provision for costs of the

action."
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.
modifying

Nature of the Case. This
a

Divorce

Decree

and

is

an

awarding

Appeal
Child

from

an

Support

Order
in

an

increased amount.
B.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below. Wendell and

Christy Welling were divorced on October 24, 1984.

(R. at 75.)

Ms. Welling petitioned to modify the Decree of Divorce by document
dated December 24, 1991 and filed December 31, 1991.

(R. at 92.)

Mr. Welling filed an Answer to the Petition and a Counter-Petition
on January 28, 1992.

(R. at 111.)
2
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Counsel was not numbered in accordance with Utah Rule of Appellate
Procedure 11(b) . For ease of reference, Ms. Welling will refer to
[. j'jes in the Transcript by their original page numbers.
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require him to submit hours or compute a total amount of time he
spends in work-related activities.

(Tr. at 40.)

Mr. Shamo also testified regarding Mr. Welling's work habits.
He was "very confident in his abilities." (Tr. at 41.) Mr. Welling
has always been a "top performer" in Mr. Shamo's Division.
47.)

(Tr. at

Mr. Shamo further agreed that Mr. Welling was a "remarkable

salesman" and declared that he "sets the standard for my Division
as far as work ethic."

(Id.)

When asked whether he expected Mr.

Welling to continue his working at his current rate for another ten
years, he stated that he believed Mr. Welling would be able to keep
pace.

(Tr. at 51.)

Finally, Mr. Shamo admitted that he did not

know whether Mr. Welling's future earnings would increase, decrease
or stay the same.
Evidence

(Tr. at 53.)
regarding Mr. Welling's

salary history and

present income came directly from Mr. Welling.
received a gross salary of $65,127.78.
received $72,478.09.

During 1990, he

(Tr. at 68.)

In 1991 he

(Id.) Mr. Welling further testified that as

of November 5, 1992, he had received $95,000.00 in salary and that
he expected to make approximately $116,000.00 for the entire year.
(Tr. at 69.)

Prior to his employment at Ethicon, Mr. Welling

worked for Lever Brothers as a Sales Representative managing a
territory.

(Tr. at 72.)

During his employment with Lever

Brothers, which began in 1985, he was paid a base salary and a
"bonus."

(Tr. at 72-73.)

He worked approximately the same hours

at that job as he worked for Ethicon at the time of trial.
4
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hroughout his brief, Mr. Welling makes much of "accepting
new responsibilities" in order to "maintain a new family."
{See
App. Br. at 4, 8, and 12.) This assertion is not supported by the
record. In fact,. Mr. Welling himself testified that he had worked
previous jobs which required the same qeneral hours as the one he
held at the time of trial.
(Tr. at 7*.
These jobs were held as
early as 1985, several years before Mr. Welling remarried (Mr.
Welling was divorced in 1984 and remarried in 1990) . (Tr. at 72.)
There was no credible testimony that Mr. Welling accepted his
present employment as a result of his re-marriage.

5

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The usual and customary definition of the statutory phrase
"full-time" is sufficiently broad to encompass the non-traditional
work

patterns

of

salesmen,

attorneys,

doctors

professionals who regularly work extended hours.

and

other

The legislative

history indicates the term "forty hours" were deleted from the
final measure, a decision which supports a broad construction of
the statute. Mr. Welling's historical work pattern has not changed
significantly since 1985 and he received nearly $116,000.00 in
salary for the year 1992.

Child support was awarded based upon a

three year average of $84,000.00.
of discretion.

Such an outcome is not an abuse

The standard of living enjoyed during the marriage

would limit alimony calculations, but is not relevant to child
support determinations.
Mr. Welling has failed to marshal the evidence in support
of the Trial Court's finding regarding Ms. Welling's need
attorneys' fees.

for

That failure is fatal to his appellate claim.

Further, the Court did, in fact, make findings with regard to
attorney's fees, and those findings are adequately supported by
substantial evidence in the record.

The Court was within its

discretion to determine that she stood in need of an attorneys' fee
award.

The Court properly disregarded a lump-sum payment of child

support from its consideration of Ms. Welling's need because the
payment was made subsequent to the time of trial.
child

support payments are not a proper
6

source

In addition,
from which to

extract attorneys1

tees.

FJ lid 1.1 y,

MM:
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attorneys' fees on appeal as a prevailing party.
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assume 'the Legislature used each term advisedly . . . .'"

State

v. Masciantonio, 850 P.2d 492, 493 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (citation
omitted).

Under either a plain meaning determination or under

standard rules of construction, the trial court's determination to
award child support based upon an average which was $30,000.00 less
than Mr. Welling's actual salary was within the court's discretion.
1.

The

plain

meaning

of

the

term

"full-time"

is

sufficiently broad to include non-traditional work patterns.
Webster's defines the phrase "full-time" as "working or operating
the

customary

Webster's

number

Collegiate

of

hours

in each day, week,

Dictionary,

(1991).

539

or month."

Merriam-Webster

defines the phrase as "involving or working a full or regular
schedule."

The New Merriam-Webster Dictionary, 307 (1989).

Other

dictionaries define the phrase as "the length of time considered to
constitute a complete work, as:
to be full-time."

a 40-hour work week is considered

Living Webster Dictionary, 394 (1975).

Review

of various state and federal decisions regarding federal employment
compensation

law

and

other

federal

authority

yields

varying

definitions.

See Words and Phrases, Vol. 17A (Supp. 1993) . In the

vast majority of definitions, reference is made to the usual or
normal work pattern involved.
Consideration of a normal 4 0-hour work week is entirely
appropriate under a reasonable analysis.
Simpson, 841 P.2d 931, 937 (Cal. 1992)

See In re Marriage of
("Established employment

norms, such as the standard 40-hour work week, are not controlling
8

but are pertinent to [establishing a reasonable work regimen].").
However,

the

trial

court

did

not

abuse

its

discretion

in

determining that the plain and ordinary meaning of the phrase
"full-time" did not require rigid "40-hour" interpretation under
the facts presented for review. Mr. Welling himself established at
trial that his work pattern was normal for the eight other salesmen
in the division.

(Tr. at 37, 50, 56.)

The record also indicates

that Mr. Welling held other employment as early as 1985 which
required approximately the same time commitment.

(Tr. at 73.) At

the time of trial, he was not paid an hourly rate at Ethicon, his
hours were not restricted, he did not submit a time sheet of any
kind, and no records of his hours were kept.

(Tr. at 40.)

This testimony amply demonstrates that Mr. Welling's position
was "full-time" within the meaning of the statute, that he had
pursued that particular work schedule for many years, and that
child support should be based upon an average of his previous three
years.

Since Mr. Welling went to great lengths at trial to

demonstrate his work ethic and skills as a salesman, (Tr. at 41,
45, 47, 49, 51), the trial court's determination was not an abuse
of discretion and should be upheld.
2.

If

statutory

interpretation

is

required,

the

legislative history amply supports the suggested construction.
Common sense and the language of Utah Code Ann. §78-457.5(2) dictate that the Legislature did not intend to limit all
earning activities to the equivalent of one 40-hour work week.
9

Rather, the statute implies a two-fold test which first considers
what is normal in the industry or career the individual has chosen
and

then

weighs

the

individual's

historical

work

pattern

in

determining an appropriate level of support.
The
construction.

language

of

Mr. Welling

the

statute

supports

the

notes that

the term

M

deleted by voice vote on the floor of the Senate.
6.) 4

suggested

40-hour n

was

(App. Br. at

Rejection of the phrase clearly indicates the Legislature's

intent to afford trial courts abundant discretion in determining
what constitutes a full-time, career position.
that

had

the

Legislature

desired

to

impose

It is also apparent
a

strict

4 0-hour

limitation, they would simply have left the language as proposed,
rather than deleting the phrase "40-hours."

It is not necessary to

torture the final language of the statute to impose an artificial
child support ceiling when such a limitation could easily have been
retained with the language of the original draft.
Rather, this Court may correctly surmise that removal of the
phrase was intended to enhance a trial court's ability to address
society's broad range of pay structures which fall outside the
parameters of a more rigid Legislative test.

The unique needs of

farmers, attorneys, court reporters, salesmen, salaried employees,
tax preparers, accountants, university staff, physicians and other

4

The Court should not consider Counsel's suggestions
regarding legislative intent, since they are not properly a part of
the Record.
10

persons who regularly work extended hours are thus more easily met
without diluting the Legislative norm of a "full-time" salary.
3.

Marital employment levels do not bar subsequent child

support increases.
Mr. Welling also urges the Court to limit child support
calculations to a work pattern "established and expected during the
marriage."

(App. Br. at 7.)

The suggested limitation to the

marriage time frame is more suited to alimony than to child support
calculations. A clear difference exists between alimony and child
support.

Alimony is an attempt on the court's part to provide

support for a receiving spouse "sufficient to maintain that spouse
as nearly as possible at the standard of living enjoyed during the
marriage." Noble v. Noble, 761 P.2d 1369, 1372 (Utah 1988). Using
such a framework, a determination of the standard of living enjoyed
by the parties during the marriage is appropriate.

However, such

a determination is not called for when addressing child support.
The suggested standard would transform the parties' income at the
time of the divorce into a ceiling on child support, making
increases of any type unattainable. That outcome would not comport
with the purposes of statutory support obligations enumerated in
Utah Code Ann. §78-45-3. Petitions to modify and other procedural
remedies that increase base calculations would become moot, a
consequence

which

cannot

have

Legislature.

11

been

the

intention

of

the

In short, Mr. Welling does not suggest, nor does it appear
from the Record, that he would consider lowering his work hours or
reducing his income.

He simply wishes to insulate many thousands

of dollars from child support calculations.5

His proper remedy if

he chooses to change professions is to request a modification,
which would be readily available in appropriate circumstances.

If

he continues to work as he always has, and his income increases,
his natural children should not be denied the benefits of his
income.
POINT II
THE UNDISPUTED EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL
SUPPORTS THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF ATTORNEYS'
FEES.
Utah Code Ann. §3 0-3-3 (1953, as amended) provides for an
award of attorneys' fees in divorce actions.

Utah Courts have

carefully enumerated three factors to be considered by the Trial
Court in determining whether attorneys' fees are appropriate:
1.

The receiving spouse must have a financial need for
the attorneys' fees,

2.

The other spouse must have a financial ability to
pay and,

3.

The award must be reasonable in light of the work
actually performed.

5

The Court properly pointed out that if Mr. Welling's
income were to lower by $3 0,000.00 in 1993, he would still not be
paying child support in excess of the guidelines. (Tr. at 97.)
12

Morgan v. Morgan, 854 P.2d 559, 568 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); Bell v.
Bell, 810 P.2d 489, 494 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).

"Both the decision

to award attorney fees and the amount of such fees are within the
sound discretion of the trial court."
836, 840 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).

Crouse v. Crouse. 817 P.2d

Mr. Welling challenges only the

first element considered by Utah Courts.
1.

Mr. Welling has failed to properly marshal the

evidence.
Mr. Welling argues that the Trial Court failed to address
Ms. Welling's need.

(App. Br. at 11.) He further asserts that her

receipt of an arrearage of child support payments should have been
considered

in determining whether Ms. Welling was capable of

providing her own attorneys' fees. Jd. Neither of these arguments
is supported by the record, nor has Mr. Welling properly marshaled
the evidence in support of the Court's finding.
The
requirement

Utah
that

Supreme

where

Court

Findings

has
of

established

Fact

are

a

strict

challenged,

an

appellant must marshal all evidence which supports the trial court
before an appellate court will consider the challenge.
To mount a successful attack on the trial
court's findings of fact, an appellant must
marshal all the evidence in support of the
trial court's findings, and then demonstrate
that even viewing it in the light most
favorable to the court below, the evidence is
insufficient
to
support
the
findings.
[Citations omitted.] [Appellant] has not begun
to carry that heavy burden. Nowhere does he
marshal the evidence supporting his version of
the facts, much less the evidence supporting
13

the trial court's findings.
Under these
circumstances, we decline to further consider
[Appellant's] attack on the factual findings.
Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985).
If the appellant fails to marshal the evidence,
the appellate court assumes that the record
supports the findings of the trial court and
proceeds to a review of the accuracy of the
lower court's conclusions of law and the
application of that law in the case.
Saunder v. Sharp, 806 P. 2d 198, 199 (Utah 1991) . This requirement
applies specifically in divorce matters and more particularly to
child support calculations.
To mount a successful challenge to the trial
court's finding with respect to the child
support calculation, [Appellant] is required to
marshal all the evidence supporting the court's
finding and demonstrate that the evidence is
insufficient to support that finding.
Watson v. Watson, 837 P. 2d 1, 4 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) .

As noted

below, the court made specific findings of fact with regard to
attorneys' fees and considerable evidence supporting those findings
appears

in the record.

Mr. Welling's

failure

to marshal

the

evidence in support of those findings provides an avenue through
which this court may presume the lower court's determination to be
correct, and proceed to consider the other issues raised on appeal.
2.

The record fully supports the Trial Court's Award.

Consideration of the Record on Appeal also yields ample
grounds for affirming the Trial Court's attorney's fee award.

Mr.

Welling does not refer to the language of the actual Findings of

14

Fact with regard to attorneys' fees.

The Court specifically

stated:
The court finds that the Defendant's attorney's
fees are approximately One Thousand and no/100
($1,000.00), and the Plaintiff's
Dollars
attorney's fees are Two Thousand and no/100
The Plaintiff earns
Dollars ($2,000.00).
eighty-seven percent (87%) of the parties'
combined gross incomes, and therefore should
pay (87%) of the attorney's fees incurred in
prosecuting
this
action,
and therefore,
Defendant is granted a judgment against the
Plaintiff of $590.00 for attorney's fees.
(R. at 211.)

The Court further noted:

The Defendant is voluntarily unemployed, and
the Court finds that she is capable of earning
$1,075.00 for purposes of computing child
support.
(R. at 210.)

These findings, when considered in light of the

evidence presented at trial, adequately demonstrate the Court's
consideration of Ms. Welling's need.
A

proper marshaling

indicates

that Ms. Welling was

unemployed at the time of the modification and that her imputed
income was a mere 13% of the total income of the parties.
66-67, 99.)

(Tr. at

Ms. Welling testified that she had a tumor during a

period between the divorce and Petition to Modify, that she had
surgery the following year, and that she was pregnant during some
portion of that time.

(Tr. at 59-60.)

She attended Weber State

University during the years in question and remained occupied
raising three children.
Ms.

Welling

had

(Tr. at 59-60, 67.) At the time of trial,

incurred

debts
15

of

Fifteen

Thousand

Dollars

($15,000.00) for college and living expenses.

(Tr. at 60.)

She

stated she did not have the ability to pay her attorneys' fees.
(Tr. at 62.)

In fact, she testified that she had "paid $700.00 so

far [in attorneys7 fees] and it's come out of our everyday living.
We had to cut back on everything just to be able to come up with
that money."

(Tr. at 62.)

This testimony was

substantially

undisputed, and clearly demonstrated Ms. Welling 7 s need.
In addition, the only evidence produced at trial that Ms.
Welling had other resources from which she could pay attorneys7
fees consisted of passing mention of $1200.00 which Ms. Welling
received in 1989, child support received for a child by another
marriage and an undisclosed amount of education grant money.
at 64, 66.)
disregard

(Tr.

In exercising its discretion, the court could properly

these

items, particularly

in light of Mr. Welling 7 s

average monthly income of nearly $10,000.00, from which he only
paid $300.00 per month in total child support. (Tr. at 88.) 6 Since
6

The trial court noted the inequity of the child support
order which was in place at the time of trial:
"The Court: And yet you've been making $65,000.00 now for three
years and you've still been paying $300.00 a month child support.
The Court: Well, regardless, that's what you have been averaging?
When you received $5,500.00 a month are you telling me that you've
thought for the past three years that $300.00 is a reasonable
figure to provide for your two children when your income was
$5,400.00?
[Mr. Welling] : No, if I was receiving the money, that much a
month, that's not what I would have sent.
The Court:
Well, in fact, this year you have receiving almost
$10,000.00 a month; have you not?
[Mr. Welling]: Averaged.
16

no abuse of discretion has been shown, this Court should uphold the
Trial Court's Findings and award of attorneys' fees.
3.

Child support payments are not an appropriate source

of attorneys' fees.
Appellant next asserts that Ms. Welling's receipt of an
arrearage payment owed on back-due child support provides money
from which attorneys' fees should have been paid.
argument does not merit serious consideration.

This circular

It is well-settled

that Findings of Fact are based on evidence adduced at trial and
Appellate courts do not consider post-trial determinations or
changes, absent a new legal proceeding.
consider post-trial evidence on appeal.
P. 2d 512, 513 (Utah 1990) .

Courts simply do not
See, Low v. Bonacci, 788

"With respect to the new evidence

offered in Bonacci's brief, we do not consider new evidence on
appeal") . The suggested funds had not been obtained at the time of
trial and were not contemplated when the court received evidence.
They cannot and should not be considered here.
Alternatively, were the Court to consider Mr. Welling's
suggestion that a post-trial child support arrearage payment should
limit Ms. Welling's attorneys' fee award, the suggested outcome

The Court: And at $10,000.00 a month you've continued only at
$300.00 for child support; does that seem fair and equitable to
you?
[Mr. Welling] : No. That's why I understood there was going to be
an increase."
(Tr. at 87, 88.)
17

would

fail

any

reasonable

test

of

equity.

The

theory

would

circumvent the stated and self-evident uses to which child support
monies should be devoted.

Child support payments support children.

They are not intended to finance extended disputes between parents
from which the children would derive little or no benefit.7

As

noted above, Ms. Welling convincingly demonstrated her urgent need
for attorneys' fees at trial, and even had the court considered the
back

child

justified.
4.

support,

the

award

would

still

have

been

amply

The attorneys' fee award should be upheld.
Ms. Welling is entitled to attorneys' fees on appeal.

Ms. Welling is also entitled to attorneys' fees on Appeal.
"Ordinarily, when fees in a divorce were awarded below to the party
who then prevails on appeal, fees will also be awarded to that
party on appeal."
1991)

Bell v. Bell. 810 P.2d 489, 494 (Utah Ct. App.

(quoting Bert v. Bert, 799 P.2d 1166, 1171 (Utah Ct. App.

1990)).

If the Court determines that Ms. Welling has substantially

prevailed on Appeal, the matter should be remanded to the Trial
Court for determination of a reasonable fee and award thereof.

7

This interpretation would also create loopholes through
which to dilute child support obligations. For example, as in this
case, a delinquent father would be allowed to make a strategic lump
sum payment at an advantageous moment, thus avoiding or diminishing
a later award of attorneys fees.
18

CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, Appellee requests that the Court uphold the
Findings, Conclusions and Order of the Trial Court, award costs,
interest and attorneys' fees on Appeal, remand for determination of
a reasonable attorneys' fee, and grant any other relief which the
Court deems appropriate.
DATED this 19th day of April,

DA\
KING & KI1
Attorneys xfor Defendant-Appellee
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the
foregoing were mailed to the following, postage prepaid, this 19th
day of April, 1994, to:

Lyle W. Hillyard, Esquire
HILLYARD, ANDERSON & OLSEN
Attorneys at Law
175 East 1st North
Logan, Utah 84321
Clerk of the Court
Utah Court of Appeals
230 South 500 E a s W 4 0 0
Salt Lake City,

DAVI
19

ADDENDUM

EXHIBIT

A

Determinative Provisions

78-45-3-

Duty of m a n .

Every father shall support his child; and every man shall support his wife
when she is in need.

30-3-3.

A w a r d of costs, a t t o r n e y a n d witness fees — Temp o r a r y alimony.

(1) In any action filed under Title 30, Chapter 3, 4, or 6, and in any action to
establish an order of custody, visitation, child support, alimony, or division of
property in a domestic case, the court may order a party to pay the costs,
attorney fees, and witness fees, including expert witness fees, of the other
party to enable the other party to prosecute or defend the action. The order
may include provision for costs of the action.
(2) In any action to enforce an order of custody, visitation, child support,
alimony, or division of property in a domestic case, the court may award costs
and attorney fees upon determining that the party substantially prevailed
upon the claim or defense. The court, in its discretion, may award no fees or
limited fees against a party if the court finds the party is impecunious or
enters in the record the reason for not awarding fees.
(3) In any action listed in Subsection (1), the court may order a party to
provide money, during the pendency of the action, for the separate support
and maintenance of the other party and of any children in the custody of the
other party.
(4) Orders entered under this section prior to entry of the final order or
judgment may be amended during the course of the action or in the final order
or judgment.

UNIFORM CIVIL LIABILITY FOR SUPPORT ACT

78-45-7.4.

78-45-7.5

Obligation — Adjusted gross income used.

Adjusted gross income shall be used in calculating each parent's share of
the child support award. Only income of the natural or adoptive parents of the
child may be used to determine the award under these guidelines.
History: C. 1953, 78-45-7.4, enacted by L.
1989, ch. 214, § 6.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch. 214 be-

78-45-7.5.

came effective on April 24, 1989, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

Determination of gross income — I m p u t e d income.

(1) As used in the guidelines "gross income" includes:
(a) prospective income from any source, including nonearned sources,
except under Subsection (3); and
(b) income from salaries, wages, commissions, royalties, bonuses, rents,
gifts from anyone, prizes, dividends, severance pay, pensions, interest,
t r u s t income, alimony from previous marriages, annuities, capital gains,
social security benefits, workers' compensation benefits, unemployment
compensation, disability insurance benefits, and payments from
"nonmeans-tested" government programs.
(2) Income from earned income sources is limited to the equivalent of one
full-time job.
(3) Specifically excluded from gross income are:
(a) Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC);
(b) benefits received under a housing subsidy program, the Job Training Partnership Act, S.S.I., Medicaid, Food Stamps, or General Assistance; and
(c) other similar means-tested welfare benefits received by a parent.
(4) (a) Gross income from self-employment or operation of a business shall
be calculated by subtracting necessary expenses required for self-employment or business operation from gross receipts. The income and expenses
from self-employment or operation of a business shall be reviewed to
determine an appropriate level of gross income available to the parent to
satisfy a child support award. Only those expenses necessary to allow the
business to operate at a reasonable level may be deducted from gross
receipts.
(b) Gross income determined under this subsection may differ from the
amount of business income determined for tax purposes.
(5) (a) When possible, gross income should first be computed on an annual
basis and then recalculated to determine the average gross monthly income.
(b) Each parent shall provide suitable documentation of current earnings, including year-to-date pay stubs or employer statements. Each parent shall supplement documentation of current earnings with copies of
tax returns from at least the most recent year to provide verification of
earnings over time and shall document income from nonearned sources
according to the source. Verification of income from records maintained
by the Office of Employment Security may be substituted for employer
statements and income tax returns.
aa^

78-45-7.5

JUDICIAL CODE

(c) Historical and current earnings shall be used to determine whether
an underemployment or overemployment situation exists.
(6) Gross income includes income imputed to the parent under Subsection
(7).
(7) (a) Income may not be imputed to a parent unless the parent stipulates
to the amount imputed or a hearing is held and a finding made that the
parent is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed.
(b) If income is imputed to a parent, the income shall be based upon
employment potential and probable earnings as derived from work history, occupation qualifications, and prevailing earnings for persons of
similar backgrounds in the community.
(c) If a parent has no recent work history, income shall be imputed at
least at the federal minimum wage for a 40-hour work week. To impute a
greater income, the judge in a judicial proceeding or the presiding officer
in an administrative proceeding shall enter specific findings of fact as to
the evidentiary basis for the imputation.
(d) Income may not be imputed if any of the following conditions exist:
(i) the reasonable costs of child care for the parents' minor children
approach or equal the amount .of income the custodial parent can
earn;
(ii) a parent is physically or mentally disabled to the extent he
cannot earn minimum wage;
(iii) a parent is engaged in career or occupational training to establish basic job skills; or
(iv) unusual emotional or physical needs of a child require the
custodial parent's presence in the home.
(8) (a) Gross income may not include the earnings of a child who is the
subject of a child support award, nor benefits to a child in the child's own
right, such as Supplemental Security Income.
(b) Social Security benefits received by a child due to the earnings of a
parent may be credited as child support to the parent upon whose earning
record it is based, by crediting the amount against the potential obligation of that parent. Other unearned income of a child may be considered
as income to a parent depending upon the circumstances of each case.
History: C. 1953, 78-45-7.5, enacted by L.
1989, ch. 214, § 7; 1990, ch. 100, § 5.
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amendment, effective April 23, 1990, added the last
sentence in Subsection (5)(b), in Subsection
(7)(b) substituted "If income is imputed to a

parent, the income shall be based" for "Income
shall be imputed to a parent based," and made
a stylistic change in Subsection (7)(c).
Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, Chapter 214
became effective on April 24, 1989, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Modification of award.
Cited.
Modification of award.
When the parties had agreed to the amount
of child support before the effective date of the
child support guidelines, the trial court erred
in modifying child support when no petition to
modify had been filed and in modifying the

support amount without finding that a material change of circumstances had occurred
since the previous order had been entered.
Bailey v. Adams, 798 P.2d 1142 (Utah Ct. App.
1990) (applying § 78-45-7.2(l)(b) prior to 1990
amendment regarding impact of guidelines on
existing support orders).
Cited in Thronson v. Thronson, 810 P.2d 428
(Utah Ct. App. 1991).

EXHIBIT

B

Order and Judgment (including Findings of Fact)

Lyle W. Hillyard #1494
HILLYARD, ANDERSON & OLSEN
Attorneys for Plaintiff
175 East 1st North
Logan, UT 84321
(801) 752-2610
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
WENDELL WILFORD WELLING,
Plaintiff,

ORDER AND JUDGMENT

vs.
Civil No. 842022686

CHRISTY MORRIS WELLING,
Defendant,

The above-entitled matter came on regularly for Trial on
Defendant's Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce before the
Honorable Judge Gordon J* Low in the above-entitled court on the
2nd day of December, 1992, at 9 o'clock a.m.

Defendant was

personally present and represented by Jean Robert Babilis of Jean
Robert Babilis & Associates and the Plaintiff was personally
present and represented by Lyle W. Hillyard of Hillyard, Anderson
& Olsen.

The Judge having heard testimony taken, the Court does

make and enter the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The court finds that the Plaintiff should be awarded

one-half, or five (5) weeks, of the children's summer vacation.
The court eliminates the first and last week of summer, which
leaves ten (10) weeks to be divided equally between the parties.

^A^QL^G
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The same formula applies to Christmas and other major holidays*
In addition, the court finds that due to the great geographical
distance between the parties, the Plaintiff should be awarded
visitation with the children, upon giving the Defendant
reasonable notice of no less than two weeks where possible, when
he is in town.

The parties should generally follow the

recommendations as outlined by the Commissioner on the attached
visitation guidelines.
2.

the court finds that the Defendant should be awarded the

use of her pre-marital surname, to-wit: MORRIS,
3.

The court finds that the Plaintiff provided the

Defendant with a 1988 .Oldsmobile in exchange for the right to
claim the parties1 two children as dependents for tax purposes
for the years through 1990 through 1995.
4.

The court finds that the Plaintiff's income has averaged

$84,000.00 over the past three years, and therefore, that is the
figure to be used when calculating child support for the parties1
two minor children.

The Defendant is voluntarily unemployed, and

the court finds that she is capable of earning $1,075.00 for
purposes of computing child support.

The court finds that the

Plaintiff has remarried, has a child born as issue of his current
marriage, and incurs work-related day care expenses.
5.

The court finds that the Defendant should be granted a

judgment against the Plaintiff in the sum of Seven Thousand Seven
Hundred Eleven Dollars and no/100 ($7,711.00) for child support
arrearages from February 1, 1992 through and including the month
2

of December, 1992, which represents the amount above and beyond
the original child support order of $300-00 per month, which has
been made by the Plaintiff.
6.

The court finds that the Defendant's attorney's fees are

approximately One Thousand Dollars and no/100 ($1,000.00), and
the Plaintiff's attorney's fees are Two Thousand Dollars and
no/100 ($2,000.00).

The Plaintiff earns eighty seven percent

(87%) of the parties' combined gross incomes, and therefore
should pay (87%) of the attorney's fees incurred in prosecuting
this action, and therefore, Defendant is granted a judgment
against the Plaintiff of $590.00 for attorney's fees.
Based on the above and foregoing, and for good cause
appearing, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the
Decree of Divorce entered October 24, 1984, may be modified as
follows:
1.

The Plaintiff is awarded one-half, or five (5) weeks, of

the children's summer vacation.

The Plaintiff is awarded

visitation with the children, upon giving the Defendant
reasonable notice of at least two weeks where possible of when he
will be in town.

The parties should generally follow the

recommendations as outlined by the Commissioner on the attached
visitation guidelines.
2.

The Defendant is awarded the use of her pre-marital

surname, to-wit: MORRIS.
3.

The Plaintiff is awarded the right to claim the parties'

two children as dependents for tax purposes for the years through
3

1990 through 1995 in exchange for a 1988 Oldsmobile.

Thereafter,

the tax dependency of the children shall belong to the Defendant.
The Plaintiff may have the option to buy the exemptions, so long
as he is current and timely in his child support payments each
year, by paying to the Defendant the tax loss by not being able
to claim the children on her and her future husband's tax returns
each year.

The parties are ordered to exchange tax returns and

indicate their incomes and work histories.
4.

The Plaintiff is ordered to pay child support in the sum

of Five Hundred Dollars and 50/100 ($500.50) per month per child,
or One Thousand One Dollar and no/100 ($1,001.00) per month,
beginning with the month of February, 1992.

Said child support

is due one-half on the 5th and one-half on the 20th of each
month, and shall terminate when each child turns eighteen (18)
years of age or graduate with their regular high school class,
whichever occurs last.
5.

The Defendant is awarded a judgment against the

Plaintiff in the sum of Seven Thousand Seven Hundred Eleven
Dollars and no/100 ($7,711.00), minus Four Thousand One Hundred
Seventy Dollars and ho/100 ($4,170.00) which he paid in December,
1992, as and for child support arrearages from February 1, 1992,
to and including the month of December, 1992, which represents
the amount above and beyond the original child support order of
$300.00 per month, for a total judgment of Three Thousand Five
Hundred Forty One Dollars and no/100 ($3,541.00).

4

6.

The Defendant is awarded a judgment against the

Plaintiff in the amount of Five Hundred Ninety Dollars and no/100
($590.00) as and for a contribution toward Defendant's attorney's
fees and costs in bringing this action.
7.

All prior orders of this court not modified herein shall

remain in full force and effect.
Dated this

$

day of^^0krf

1993.

BY THE COURTS

D'RDON j / LOW
District Court Judge
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing ORDER AND JUDGMENT was mailed, postpaid, to Defendant's
attorney, Jean Robert Babilis, at 4185 Harrison Boulevard, Suite
300, Ogden, Utah 84403, this

day of August, 1993.
Secretary
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EXHIBIT

Order

C

Lyle W.-, iillyard #1494
HILLYARD, ANDERSON & OLSEN
Attorneys for Plaintiff
175 East 1st North
Logan, UT 84321
(801) 752-2610
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
WENDELL WILFORD WELLING,
Plaintiff,

ORDER

vs.
Civil No. 842022686

CHRISTY MORRIS WELLING,
Defendant.

BASED on the Court's Memorandum Decision dated the 6th day
of August, 1993, it is hereby Ordered:
1.

That Exhibit A of Defendant's Petition be modified as

shown on Plaintiff's Exhibit D and be submitted to the Court for
signature, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit A to this order
and by this signing shall become entered by the court as its
order in the December 2, 1992, hearing.
2.

That Defendant's request for additional attorneys fees

and costs is denied and Plaintiff's request that attorneys fees
be abated is also denied.
3.

That Defendant's request for a wage assignment is
^

denied.
Dated this

^

day of * ^ ^ « t ; 1993.
BY THE COl

D i s t r i c t Court Judge

re:

•7—r

±

..
\JLi'

ttfdOo'SjlbPfc
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing ORDER was mailed, postpaid, to Defendant's attorney,
Jean Robert Babilis, at 4185 Harrison Boulevard, Suite 300,
Ogden, Utah 84403, this f3

day of August, 1 9 ^ V /

Secretary
EXHIBIT
e:\lwh\pl\welling.orl

Order

C

EXHIBIT

D

Current Mailing Certificate

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that two true and correct

copies of the

Addendum, Exhibits A, B, C, and D were mailed to the following,
postage prepaid, this 2i5th day of April, 1994, to:

Lyle W. Hillyard, Esquire
HILLYARD, ANDERSON & OLSEN
Attorneys at Law
175 East 1st North
Logan, Utah 843 21
Clerk of the Court
Utah Court of Appeals
230 South 500 Easji #400
Salt Lake City, ytftJth 84102

